Strawberries and Why Contemporary Halakha Has Stagnated

As many of you know, there is a website, including video, making the rounds proving that strawberries are infested with a "new" insect called thrips.

Several points:

1) Thrips have been abundant for well over 100 million years http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thysanoptera#Evolution_and_systematics

2) A quick review of the agricultural literature reveals that thrips infestation of straweberries is most definitely not new, here's just one of many examples: http://ohioline.osu.edu/rc299/rc299_9.html

3) R. Moshe Feinstein argues that any insect that is not clearly visible to the naked eye is not of Halakhic concern (Iggerot Moshe, YD4:2). R. Nachum Rabinovitz makes a similar argument that even if the insect is visible but does not appear to be a living creature to the naked eye is of no Halakhic concern (Shu"t Siach Nachum 45)

4) The video appears to have been filmed through a zoom lens that paints a picture more magnified than can the naked eye.

What does this have to do with stagnation of Halakha?

A friend reported to me that a prominent Rabbi this past Shabbat delivered a shiur on strawberries. In reviewing the issue, he stated that R. Rabinovitz's book has many radical responsa.

Now ... I've been through that book, and I can find nothing even approaching radical. Original and creative, but not radical. It's not like R. Professor Daniel Sperber permitting women to have aliyot, or R. Sherlo raising the issue of allowing older single women to become pregnant through artificial insemination. Au contraire, his book is filled with good old fashioned creativity and original thinking.

I asked my friend if anyone asked said prominent Rabbi what about the book is radical. Answer: no.

So ... why has Halakha stagnated? Because anyone daring to be creative and ... heaven forefend ... original ... is labeled by his contemporaries as "radical" and the masses nod their heads and accept it.

I find this especially ironic in that R. Rabinovitz is a product of the chareidishe velt.

What Torah Is

A very wise young woman commented on my blog that it focuses on what Torah isn't but says nothing about what it is; a very true comment indeed.

The reason is simple. Rambam ascribes to an apophatic theology. As a general rule, human beings can only reach an understanding of what God isn't rather than what He is.

Similarly, I would suggest, understanding what Torah isn't is much easier than understanding what it is. To understand what it is, you actually have to know something, and, unfortunately, I don't.

That being said, just as I am not a musician and cannot write music, but I can know that when I'm listening to Harry Chapin ZT"L sing Cat's in the Cradle, or Dan Fogelberg ZT"L sing Leader of the Band, I am experiencing Divinely inspired music, so too … when I read a piece written by a great Rabbi that reflects what Torah is, I know it when I see it.

As a general observation, I suspect that many of us, including myself, fail to grasp what Torah is because we are too caught up with the trees of Halakha to notice and understand the forest of Torah.

So, in order to help balance this blog just a bit and not always focus on what Torah isn't, and since I myself am not capable of writing what Torah is, I will, from time to time, reference a piece, written by a great Rabbi, that does exactly that.

So, in that spirit, I refer you to this article by R. Yuval Sherlo, which also appears in this week's "Shabbaton" Shabbat sheet.

Shabbat shalom, and may we all merit to experience again Harry Chapin and Dan Fogelberg in the next world … and of course, only during lunch breaks after hearing shiur from R. Sherlo.

A Man's Prohibition Doth Not Create A Woman's Obligation

As a follow up to the mehadrin bus issue, an additional thought.

Prohibitions upon a man do not create an obligation upon a woman.

The Shulhan Arukh (EH: 21:1; quoted below in footnote 1) prohibits a man from ogling a woman's little finger, yet, to the best of my knowledge, no one ever ruled that a woman is obligated to cover her fingers.

Moreover, the same paragraph in the Shulhan Arukh prohibits a man from staring at a woman's colorful clothing, even when she's not wearing it. Yet no one ever ruled that it is prohibited for a woman to wear colored clothing, even if the woman's intent is to draw the attention of men (see Rashi on Bereshit 49:11, quoted below in footnote 2).

These points should be self-explanatory, but for those who need a Rabbinic source beyond the Shulhan Arukh and Rashi, see Shu"t Bnai Banim; 3:26 (quoted below in footnote 3).


1) שולחן ערוך אבן העזר הלכות אישות סימן כא
א] צריך אדם להתרחק מהנשים א מאד מאד. ב] ואסור לקרוץ בידיו או ברגליו ולרמוז בעיניו לאחד מהעריות. ג] ואסור לשחוק עמה, להקל ראשו כנגדה ב ד] או להביט ביופיה. ואפילו להריח בבשמים שעליה אסור. ואסור להסתכל בנשים שעומדות על הכביסה. ואסור להסתכל בבגדי צבעונים של אשה שהוא מכירה, אפי' אינם עליה, שמא יבא להרהר בה. פגע אשה בשוק, אסור להלך אחריה, ה] אלא רץ ו] ומסלקה לצדדין ז] או לאחריו. ג (א) ולא יעבור בפתח אשה זונה, אפילו ברחוק ארבע אמות. והמסתכל אפילו באצבע קטנה של אשה ח] ונתכוין ליהנות ממנה, כאלו נסתכל בבית התורף (פי' ערוה) שלה. ואסור לשמוע ד קול ערוה או לראות שערה. ט] והמתכוין לאחד מאלו הדברים, מכין אותו מכת מרדות. י] ואלו הדברים אסורים גם בחייבי לאוין.

2) רש"י בראשית פרק מט:יא
וצבעונין הוא לשון סותה שהאשה לובשתן ומסיתה בהן את הזכר ליתן עיניו בה.


3) ובהרבה ענינים האיסור הוא על האיש ולא על האשה ... וכן במסכת עבודה זרה דף כ' עמוד ב' אסור להסתכל בבגדים צבעוניים של אשה אבל אינו אסור לה ללבוש אותם, אף על פי שמתכוונת שהזכר יתן עינים בה כפרש"י בפרשת ויחי על הכתוב בני אתונו.

Should Our Behavior Follow the Written Halakha or Perhaps Vice Versa

I remember well years ago, not so long after I had made aliyah, that a new oleh moved into the neighborhood. Not just a stam oleh, but a talmid hacham (and I don't use that term lightly).

Well, the practice in our shul, a widespread practice all over Israel, was for the shta"tz to lower the volume of his voice as he prompted the cohanim with birkat cohanim, word by word.

The new oleh was not fond of this practice. Why? Well, in all honesty, the poskim, even the rishonim, talk about this practice, and it's pretty unarguable that their directives call for the sha"tz to remain at the same volume of voice. The new oleh made his discomfort well known, which brought to the shul some degree of discord.

Why discord. It seems pretty reasonable to oppose something the rishonim and poskim opposed, right? I mean, there it was in black and white, just staring at us in the face. And shouldn't our behavior follow the written Halakha?

Let's see how the tosafot may have dealt with this issue.

In the first mishna of the 7th chapter of Berakhot, we learn:

שלשה שאכלו כאחת חייבין לזמן.
Three people who eat together must say zimun.

The gemara brings a disagreement between Rav and R. Yochanan as to whether two men are allowed to make a zimmun.

To answer that question, the Gemara brings the following beraita from Arachin:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף מה עמוד ב
תא שמע: נשים מזמנות לעצמן, ועבדים מזמנים לעצמן, נשים ועבדים וקטנים אם רצו לזמן - אין מזמנין; (והא נשים אפילו מאה) והא מאה נשי כתרי גברי דמיין, וקתני: נשים מזמנות לעצמן ועבדים מזמנין לעצמן! - שאני התם, דאיכא דעות.

That is, since the din of two men is equal to the din of a hundred women, and since we learn in a beratia that women do make a zimmun, then two men should be able to make a zimun. But the Gemara rejects this argument as follows: while it is true that the din of two men is generally equal to the din of three women, in this case it doesn't apply, since … it is critical to have three unique individuals for zimmun.

Now, take a look at Tosafot (patiently … we will get to our issue shortly).

שאני התם דאיכא דעות - מכאן משמע דנשים יכולות לזמן לעצמן וכן עשו בנות רבינו אברהם חמיו של רבינו יהודה ע"פ אביהן ומיהו לא נהגו העולם כן וקשה אמאי לא נהגו מדקתני מזמנות משמע דקאמר חייבות לזמן וי"ל דנשים מזמנות לעצמן היינו אם רצו לזמן מזמנות וכן משמע קצת הלשון מדקתני בסמוך נשים ועבדים אם רצו לזמן אין מזמנין ועוד דמדמה ליה הגמרא לשנים משמע דחובה ליכא והא דקאמר בריש ערכין (דף ג. ושם) הכל מחוייבין בזימון לאתויי נשים לענין רשות קאמר ולא לענין חובה

Tosafot say that from this suggya, it is apparent that three women can make their own zimmun, and, in fact, that's exactly what the daughters of R. Avraham did. Just one problem … tosafot notes that this is not widely practiced. They looked around and saw that women are not making zimmun. Why not? Tosafot concludes that when the Gemara says "women make zimmun" it must have meant they have the option to make zimmun, but not that it is obligatory. But there is a slight problem with this conclusion, note the tosafot. The Gemara in Arachain 3a writes that women are "obligated" to make zimmun.

Now we have a problem. Tosafot note that women are not making zimmun. But the Gemara in Arachin specifically says they are obligated. It's right there, in black and white!

So how do Tosafot resolve this problem … and I kid you not: Nah, that's not what the Gemara in Arachin means. When it says that women are "obligated", it really means that it's "optional".

In the immortal words of Maxwell Smart, "Would you believe." (Google it if you're too young to understand the reference).

So, for those of us who think that our behavior must always follow the written Halakha and never the other way around … guess again. The re-reading of texts to fit common practice is a well known phenomenon among Ashkenazic rishonim. This particular instance is just the most classic case that comes to mind.

As a side note, the development of the minhag whereby the sha"tz lowers the volume of his voice when prompting the cohanim is fascinating. The Yesodei Yeshurun notes that there was a difference between Bavel and Israel. In Bavel, the custom was to prompt, and in Israel not to prompt (based on the prohibition of a non-cohain to do birkat cohanim). I suggest that the minhag for the sha"tz to lower his voice developed as a comprise between the two postions of yes prompting versus no prompting, i.e., the sha"tz lowers his voice significantly when prompting. That a minhag takes the middle road between two approaches in Halakha, adopting neither one of them, is a common phenomenon. Another example is with the placement of mezuzah. There are two approaches in Halakha: vertical and horizontal. A commonly practiced minhag is to place it on a diagonal, as a comprise between the two approaches. This phenomenon is discussed in Sperber's Minhagei Yisrael. The application of it to this particular issue is my own chiddush, which I believe to be correct, but take it for what it's worth.

Obsessing Over Issues of Modesty

Before we approach the issue of "darcha acharita", avoiding temptations, let's examine the Halakhic parameters of two prohibitions.

1) Hirhurim … sexual thoughts. Many think that it is prohibited for a man to experience any such thoughts whatsoever about any woman (other than his wife, obviously) ever. Well, I don't know what is and what isn't prohibited. I only know what others have said. Both the Me'iri and the Ezer Mekudash (quoted in Otzar HaPoskim 23:3:8:2, for your convenience), both frum yidden, maintain that it is prohibited to engage in purposeful and intentional sexual fantasy. Occasional thoughts are not prohibited, as long as not purposeful and intentional. So guess what, gents. Chill. You may, on occasion, experience some level of inappropriate thoughts. It may be the way men were built, an issue which would require another post by a social biologist. In the words of the Ezer Mekudash, "the Torah was not given to angels." You are not angels, gentlemen. Get over it. You are not obligated to decimate such thoughts, even when they occur, on occasion, inappropriately. A simple victory by "fall" (to use a wrestling term) is all that is required. Do not act on these desires, including … no purposeful intentional sexual fantasy. Beyond that, there is no Halakhic obligation to be overly focused on this challenge. Don't obsess. R. Yisrael Salanter (אגרות ומכתבים מאת ר' ישראל סלנטר, מהד'שרגא הכהן וילמן, סי' כה ) wrote that obsessing over these thoughts can act as a boomerang and make them even stronger.

2) Seeing/staring at/ogling a woman. Halakha does not prohibit seeing any part of a woman other than the genital area (see Shu"t Naharei Afarsimon, EH 19). The poskim distinguish between seeing and staring. This distinction is found all over the place in the Halakhic literature, but if you can't find it, then hit the books, get back to the beit midrash, and in the meantime, take a look at Yad Malachi (179) since that's the source that comes to me off the top of my head. Staring at part of a woman defined as "erva" is prohibited. Staring at parts of a woman not defined as erva is not prohibited, as long as there is no intent to derive pleasure. Ogling, that is, intentionally deriving pleasure from staring at a woman, is prohibited even if ogling the woman's small finger. Stop worrying about what you might see in the bus, at work, or elsewhere. I have NEVER seen a woman in public whose genital area is exposed. Don’t stare at a woman who is not dressed in accordance with normal social standards (see below). And never ogle. Get a grip. The distinction between staring, with no intent of deriving pleasure, versus ogling is to be found in the Rambam, Bi'ah 21:1 versus 21:21.

It is important to note that societal norms determine what parts of a woman's body are defined as erva. If you live in a society where social norms sanction mini-skirts, belly shirts and halter tops, then areas of the body exposed by such clothing are not defined as erva. Sound too modern? Take a look at Dirvei Hamudot (Brackhot 3:116 ) who writes that the upper arms of women are considered erva only in a society where women normally cover them. Well, maybe that only applies to a lady's upper arms? Guess again. Yaskil Avdi (vol. 4; EH:9 ) writes that in a society where social norms sanction exposed breasts they are not considered erva (click here and see the last paragraph and continue to the next page).

The degree to which a man is vulnerable to "immodest" dress is directly proportional to the degree of modesty to which he is accustomed. A man who lives in a haredi neighborhood and never leaves it is most vulnerable to dress codes less modest than those of his neighborhood. A man living in a haredi neighborhood who works in N. Tel Aviv (there must be at least one such person in the country) is less vulnerable. A man living in a mixed religious / secular neighborhood is yet less vulnerable. This should be obvious, but for those who want a Rabbinic source, see Shu"t Siach Nachum 92. So … a dati-leumi man living in a city (as opposed to an all religious settlement) is considerably less vulnerable to temptations than his haredi or settler colleagues.

Most important, this discussion should be quite unnecessary. Common sense is a really good rule of thumb here. Sound not so frum? Take a look at the Ritv"a at the end of Kiddushin and see that he says exactly that. True, he does say it is improper (though not prohibited) for anyone other than a saintly gent to take this approach, but see Shu"t Bnei Banim, vol 4, article 2 here where R. Henkin broadens this approach to include the average person as long as within the standards of modesty to which said person is accustomed.

Click here to see more of R. Yehuda Henkin's writings regarding how societal norms play a factor in the halakhot of modesty.

All this being said, why shouldn't we just adopt the most stringent positions in issues of modesty.

The answer is twofold:
1) the boomerang effect mentioned above in the name of R. Yisrael Salanter
2) the cost to society … stay tuned

I hope to write on the following issues in the near future:
1) darcha acharita – avoiding temptation
2) the societal price paid in mehadrin approaches
3) unity or uniformity … do those singing the song of achdut have any clue what they are saying?

Xenophobia

I posted earlier that I would write next about "darcha acharita", avoiding temptation, and more on the societal price of mehadrin products and services, but I got sidetracked.

Last night, as I read one of the parsha leaflets, Maayanei HeYeshua, widely considered to be mainstream in the Dati Leumi camp (kinda scary), I came across an article on R. Noach Weinberg, founder of Aish HaTorah, who recently passed away.

R. Noach was a great man. It is both due to his institution and despite that institution that I became frum. But that's a long story.

Anyway, the article, presumably written by a student and/or follower, said the following. "R. Noach warned us that if you don't know what you are prepared to die for, it's a sign that you don't know what you are living for."

And as I read this, I thought to myself, "Well, this is ironic".

You see, R. Noach developed a well-known course on the "48 Ways to Wisdom" based on the Mishna, Avot 6:6, which lists bringing a quote in the name of whoever said it as one of the 48 ways that Torah is acquired. In fact, the mishna continues to teach us that one who brings a quote in the name of whoever said it brings redemption to the world.

So, where's the irony?

The gent who first taught this principle … of knowing what you'd be prepared to die for … was none other than … Martin Luther King, Jr. His exact words were, " I submit to you that if a man hasn't discovered something that he will die for, he isn't fit to live".

I admit, MLK may have not have invented the saying, but he certainly is the one who made it famous. And I'm fairly certain he didn't hear it from R. Noach, who came onto the scene after MLK was assassinated (1968).

Now, I don't know who dropped the attribution to MLK, whether R. Noach himself or his disciple, but whatever the case may be, I suspect that xenophobia may have played a role in R. Noach's becoming the creator of this saying in the eyes of many.

You see, MLK was … ummmm … not Jewish. Heaven forefend we should learn such an important value from a non-Jew. And even worse … he wasn't just a non-Jew. He was … gasp … BLACK (or African American, but I think back then it was black). Help! I'm fainting!!

I mean really … I just don't get it. Ben Zoma says in Pirkei Avot, "who is wise … one who learns from every wo/man".

There are, indeed, lots of things we can learn from non-Jews. And Ben Zoma knew that and encouraged it.

Which reminded me of a shiur I once heard back in the mid-80s. In that shiur, the Rabbi of the shul I attended said, based on the one of the commentators to Avot 3:14 (I can't remember who it was … let's call him Ploni), that non-Jews are not in the category of "created in the image of God".

Now, some of the more reasonable folks in the shiur squirmed in their chairs. And how did the Rabbi react? "I didn't invent this! Here it is, in black and white. We can't disagree with Ploni as we don't reach his toe in Torah".

Just one slight problem, the Tiferet Yisrael and just about everyone else and his mother disagree with Ploni and write explicitly the obvious … all humankind is included in the category of "created in the image of God". In fact, R. Barcuh HaLevi Epstein writes in his commentary on that mishna that R. Akiva's principle of "you shall love your neighbor as yourself" applies to non-Jews as well.

But alas, this Rabbi had a hat, and suit … and even a tie … and learned for years in some great yeshiva or other, and … the congregation was not the most solidly grounded in Torah scholarship, so … a whole bunch of people went home from shiur feeling just a bit xenophobic.

Of course, I took the shiur with a grain of salt given that I had previously heard same Rabbi, in answering a she'eila on borer, explain the difference between ikar and tafel. Bong! Wrong answer. Ikar and tafel are concepts in Hilkhot brachot; ochel and psolet would have been the distinction to make.

So much for hats, suits, ties and years of learning in some great yeshiva or other.

And this dude is currently the director of the Vaad HaRabbanim of a major Orthodox community in the US. Kinda scary.

Stay tuned for more on darcha achrita and mehadrin.

Shavua tov.

Next Post

Hello readers.

First, I encourage all comments, even those which sharply disagree with my posts.

Hamasig was kind enough to respond to my post on Mehadrin buses.

S/he raised the issue of "darcha acharita", a concept discussed in Bava Batra related to avoiding nisyonot.

In my next post, I hope to examine the Halakhic parameters of darcha acharita, and more broadly, the societal price paid in adopting "mehadrin" positions.

Stay tuned, and thank you for reading and/or responding.

Chuck